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     The Honorable Sandra Day O’Connor, Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme*
Court of the United States, sitting by designation.
     NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 07-4279
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
DEMETRIO COLUMNA-ROMERO,
       Appellant
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
D.C. Criminal No. 07-cr-00239
(Honorable Juan R. Sanchez)
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 20, 2008
Before:  SCIRICA, Chief Judge, RENDELL, Circuit Judge,
and O’CONNOR, Retired Associate Justice*
(Opinion Filed December 30, 2008 )
OPINION OF THE COURT
     At the plea hearing, Columna-Romero reserved the right to challenge the imposition1
of a sentence under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2), based upon a prior conviction of an aggravated
felony.  Columna-Romero had previously been convicted of attempted robbery in New
York.  The Presentence Investigation Report factored this prior conviction into its
calculations.  Columna-Romero’s sentencing memorandum attested to the conviction, and
his counsel acknowledged it at the sentencing hearing.
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SCIRICA, Chief Judge.
Defendant Demetrio Columna-Romero was sentenced to 41 months’ imprisonment
under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2).  He appeals this sentence as unreasonable and
contrary to his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.  We disagree, and will affirm. 
I.
On July 9, 2007, Columna-Romero, a citizen of Mexico, pleaded guilty to a single
count of reentry after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a).   There was no plea1
agreement.  Based on Columna-Romero’s offense level and criminal history category, the
Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) calculated an advisory Sentencing Guidelines
range of 41–51 months.  Neither party objected to the PSR.  The District Court held a
sentencing hearing on October 30, 2007.  Prior to this hearing, Columna-Romero
submitted a sentencing memorandum requesting a downward variance, based both on his
personal circumstances and on the fact that he was arrested in a district that lacked a fast-
track program for handling offenses such as his.  Had this fast-track program been
available, Columna-Romero asserted, he would have participated in it and received a
lower sentence.  This created a disparity in sentencing treatment that supported a variance
     The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have appellate2
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  We review the District
Court’s sentencing decision for abuse of discretion, to ensure that the court committed no
significant procedural error and that the sentence is substantively reasonable.  See United
States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 217–18 (3d Cir. 2008).
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from the PSR’s advised range.  Columna-Romero reiterated these arguments at his
sentencing hearing.  Having heard from Columna-Romero and the Government, and
having considered the PSR and the sentencing recommendations of the Probation
Department and the Government, the District Court found that “all the evidence before
[it] supports a reasonable sentence to be imposed within the guideline range.” 
Accordingly, the court imposed a sentence of 41 months’ imprisonment, 3 years’
supervised release, and a $100 special assessment (which was waived).  This timely
appeal followed.2
II.
Columna-Romero’s first contention on appeal is that the District Court
misunderstood the extent of its sentencing authority when it denied his request for a
downward variance based on the absence of a fast-track program in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.  According to Columna-Romero, the court erred in two respects: by
declining to find that, under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6), the absence of a fast-track program
created an “unwarranted sentence disparit[y]” between himself and other “defendants
with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct”; and by failing to
account for the absence of this program in its analysis of the other § 3553(a) factors. 
4These errors, Columna-Romero contends, demonstrate that the District Court treated the
Sentencing Guidelines as mandatory rather than advisory in violation of United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), thereby rendering his sentence procedurally unreasonable.
As the District Court recognized, this matter is governed by our decision in United
States v. Vargas, 477 F.3d 94 (3d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 199 (2007).  Vargas,
like Columna-Romero, was sentenced under § 1326(a) and (b)(2). He contended the
District Court should have considered the disparity between fast-track and non-fast-track
districts in fashioning his sentence.  We surveyed our sister circuits and held, as “the
Second and Fourth through Eleventh Circuits” had, “that a district court’s refusal to
adjust a sentence to compensate for the absence of a fast-track program does not make a
sentence unreasonable.”  Id. at 99.  We found that, since Congress had authorized the
scheme for creating fast-track districts, see PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, §
401(m)(2)(B), 117 Stat. 650, 675 (2003), the sentence disparities that may result from the
implementation of that scheme could not be “unwarranted” under § 3553(a)(6).  See
Vargas, 477 F.3d at 100.  Furthermore, we noted that, to prove such an “unwarranted
disparity,” “the burden [is] on the defendant to demonstrate similarity by showing that
other defendants’ ‘circumstances exactly paralleled’ his.”  Id. (quoting United States v.
Charles, 467 F.3d 828, 833 n.7 (3d Cir. 2006)).  We found “[t]here has been no such
showing here, and a court should not consider sentences imposed on defendants in other
cases in the absence of such a showing by a party.”  Id.  Additionally, we pointed out that
5“[a] court should not create its own fast-track program or substitute its own sentencing
guidelines for those of the Sentencing Commission,” as “the establishment of fast-track
programs is a matter left to Congress and the Attorney General, and the review of national
sentencing practices and formulation of advisory sentencing guidelines is a matter left to
the Sentencing Commission.”  Id.  Lastly, we concluded that “even if we were to find that
Vargas had shown that fast-track programs created an unwarranted disparity with
similarly situated defendants under § 3553(a)(6), . . . the District Court exercised its
discretion by considering the relevant § 3553(a) factors.  This exercise of discretion is
further evidence that Vargas’ sentence was reasonable, even in light of any disparity
created by fast-track programs.”  Id. 
The District Court relied on Vargas in rejecting Columna-Romero’s fast-track
contention.  Under Vargas, it found, “the burden is upon the defendant to demonstrate
similarity by showing the other defendants’ circumstances were exactly parallel.” 
Furthermore, “[a]s a trial judge, I should not create—or a trial court—cannot create its
own fast-track program or substitute its own sentencing guidelines for those of the
Sentencing Commission.”  And lastly, “[t]he Third Circuit has rejected the disparity
between fast-track and non-fast-track sentencing, because Congress has expressly
approved them . . . .  Such a disparity, therefore, could not be considered unwarranted . . .
.”  The District Court then moved from § 3553(a)(6) to the rest of the § 3553(a) analysis,
noting that it “ha[s] been asked to consider the same argument of the fast-track disparity
6under the remaining . . . 3553(a) factors.  And I find the argument unpersuasive for the
reasons previously stated and the reasons that I will explain now.”  The court then
reviewed Columna-Romero’s personal history and circumstances in light of those factors,
concluding that “a sentence within the guidelines is sufficient but not greater than
necessary to accomplish the penal goals of punishment.”
We see no procedural error in this determination.  The District Court explicitly
acknowledged “the United States Sentencing Guidelines are no longer mandatory, but are
advisory pursuant to [Booker].”  It found no unwarranted disparity under § 3553(a)(6),
and then considered the remaining § 3553(a) factors in light of all of the relevant
evidence and arguments before it, including Columna-Romero’s fast-track argument.  It
recognized its authority to impose a sentence below the advised range, but it determined a
sentence within the Guidelines was reasonable and a downward variance was
inappropriate.  Columna-Romero contends the District Court’s statements at the
sentencing hearing do not adequately demonstrate that it understood its authority to
consider his fast-track argument in its § 3553(a) analysis.  We disagree.  We have
recognized that “because district court judges render sentencing decisions orally and
spontaneously from the bench after the presentation of numerous arguments, we do not
expect them to deliver ‘a perfect or complete statement of all of the surrounding law.’” 
Vargas, 477 F.3d at 101 (quoting United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 330 n.8 (3d Cir.
2006)); see also Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2468 (2007) (“The sentencing
7judge should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the
parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking
authority.  Nonetheless, when a judge decides simply to apply the Guidelines to a
particular case, doing so will not necessarily require lengthy explanation.” (citation
omitted)).  Here, the District Court made sufficiently clear that it had considered
Columna-Romero’s fast-track argument with respect to all of the § 3553(a) factors, but
had found the argument unpersuasive in light of the evidence before it.  This was a proper
exercise of discretion under Booker, and resulted in a procedurally reasonable
determination of Columna-Romero’s sentence.
According to Columna-Romero, however, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007), calls into question whether fast-track
programs cannot create “unwarranted disparities” because Congress has explicitly
approved their creation and scheme of implementation.  We recognize that Kimbrough
has prompted reconsideration of the role fast-track programs may play in a sentencing
court’s § 3553(a) analysis, and whether disparities resulting from the fast-track sentencing
scheme may now be considered “unwarranted” under § 3553(a)(6).  Compare United
States v. Rodríguez, 527 F.3d 221, 229 (1st Cir. 2008), with United States v. Gomez-
Herrera, 523 F.3d 554, 562–63 (5th Cir. 2008), and United States v. Vega-Castillo, 540
F.3d 1235, 1238–39 (11th Cir. 2008), reh’g en banc denied, 548 F.3d 980 (11th Cir.
2008).  But we do not reach that issue here.  As the District Court noted, in proving an
8“unwarranted disparity” under § 3553(a)(6), Columna-Romero bore the burden of putting
forth evidence of other defendants with parallel circumstances who have received lower
sentences pursuant to a fast-track program.  See Vargas, 477 F.3d at 100.  The record
does not reflect such evidence.  Columna-Romero has made general assertions regarding
the existence of fast-track programs in other districts and the availability of lower
sentences through such programs.  But he has not identified other defendants, with
parallel circumstances and records, who were eligible for and received such lower
sentences.  Thus, as the District Court found, Columna-Romero has not carried his burden
in showing an “unwarranted disparity” under § 3553(a)(6).  Kimbrough, even if relevant
to Vargas, would not alter this determination.  As to the rest of the § 3553(a) analysis, the
District Court considered Columna-Romero’s fast-track argument, and Kimbrough would
not require that the court find this argument any more persuasive than it already has. 
Accordingly, the District Court understood and exercised its discretion properly in this
case, and did not commit procedural error in imposing Columna-Romero’s sentence.
III.
Columna-Romero also contends that, in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466 (2000), the District Court’s consideration of his prior conviction in its sentencing
decision under § 1326(b)(2) violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, as the prior
conviction was neither charged in the indictment nor admitted at his guilty plea.  As
Columna-Romero acknowledges, and as we also found in Vargas, this challenge is
     Columna-Romero concedes this authority controls, and only raises the challenge to3
preserve it in the event the Supreme Court were to reverse Almendarez-Torres.
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foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998); United
States v. Coleman, 451 F.3d 154, 159–60 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 991
(2007); and United States v. Ordaz, 398 F.3d 236, 241 (3d Cir. 2005).  See Vargas, 477
F.3d at 104–05.3
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we find the sentence reasonable and will affirm the
judgment of conviction and sentence.
